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BRIEFING FOR OCD  
STAFF COLLEGE, Battle Creek

I propose to concentrate this morning on the two major threats to the West--the Soviet Union and Communist China--and then, as time permits, take up Vietnam and Southeast Asia, the Cuban threat to Latin America, and a quick look at some of the world's other trouble spots.

A word on the ground rules: You may get the feeling that some of the material I cover corresponds to what you have already received from the press, radio, and TV.

Technically, however, we classify the material I am going to cover as "SECRET," not because we are unaware that it has been in print, but because I am summing up for you the findings of the U.S. Government intelligence services. Some press reports are right, and some are wrong, and the Communists are welcome to read our newspapers, but we do not want to hand the opposition the judgments of the U.S. intelligence services, as expressed by a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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THE SOVIET UNION

Leadership

I. The men who threw Khrushchev out of the Kremlin  
~~more than three~~  
~~two or three~~ years ago have now had time to

establish their policies, their relationships,  
and their way of doing business.

A. What has emerged is essentially a collective  
leadership.

1. I think it was George Orwell, however,  
who advanced the thesis that under Commu-  
nism some people are more equal than others,  
and this seems to apply to the Secretary-  
General of the Communist Party, Leonid  
Brezhnev.

2. Brezhnev's standing has been growing  
steadily. He appears at least to be first  
among equals.

3. But the major decisions, by and large, are  
apparently reached by compromise, and im-  
plemented with caution.

B. This type of collective leadership eliminates  
the erratic initiatives Khrushchev was noted  
for, and it reduces the chances of making big  
mistakes. It has two inherent weaknesses,  
however.

4 of 11:

Brezhnev, Kosygin,  
Podgorny, Suslov.

1. First, there is a built-in tendency to duck or postpone the hard decisions. For instance, such highly political problems as economic reform, and the allocation of critical resources, have not been resolved.

2. Second, the government develops a split personality, with collective leadership on the surface, while a subtle struggle for power and position continues under cover.

C. The present leaders are a blend of mixed interests and authority, and whatever they may now think of the one-man regimes of Stalin and Khrushchev, that's where they learned the game.

1. They have not yet demonstrated that their machinery can make the hard decisions over the long run, and at the same time check the natural drift toward one-man rule.
2. So far, they have held together remarkably well, mainly by undramatic, middle-of-the-road policies. The guiding principle has been: "Don't rock the boat."

II. This Kremlin rule-by-committee in no sense implies any weakening of the major thrust of Soviet foreign policy, which continues to center on the expansion of Russian influence beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.

A. The Cold War did not end with the Cuban missile crisis, the fall of Khrushchev, the nuclear test ban treaty, or the Sino-Soviet dispute.

B. Rather, the Cold War has changed its character and its tactics. It is more political, more subtle, more gradual. The goals remain the same.

C. The low-keyed style of Brezhnev and Kosygin, in fact, is probably better suited to the Cold War and the nuclear stalemate, as they now stand, than the flamboyance of Khrushchev.

#### Military

III. One good measure of Communist commitment to the continuation of the Cold War is to examine what the Russians are doing to prepare for a possible "Hot War." For several years the Soviet Union has been putting a major effort into a dynamic program of military research and development, looking for some kind of a breakthrough that

might end the nuclear stalemate and swing the balance of power in Soviet favor.

(CHART, SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING)

A. Soviet spending for defense and space <sup>in 1967</sup> ~~this year~~ according to all of the evidence we have on their various weapons programs, amounts <sup>ed</sup> to 20.4 billion rubles--the largest budget since World War Two. This is buying them a military posture and a space program that would cost about 56 billion dollars in this country.

1. If you take our defense budget for Fiscal 1967, and lop off approximately 19 billion dollars for expenditures directly related to the fighting in Vietnam, the answer is also 56 billion dollars.
2. In other words, the Soviets--with an economy which is less than half the size of ours--are sustaining a comparable military and space effort.
3. For a completely valid comparison, we have to add certain expenditures of NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission to the U.S. defense budget. On that basis, again excluding our direct Vietnam spending, the comparable cost here of the Soviet military and space effort for the past five years has averaged 85 percent of what we have been spending on the same programs.

B. The Soviets have announced that they are going to

increase their defense and space spending by  
15 percent ~~next~~ <sup>this</sup> year.

1. As you can see from this chart, the actual spending does not always increase in direct proportion to the publicly announced budget, which is considerably smaller.
  2. We estimate, however, that total Soviet spending in 1968 will be around 23 billion rubles, for programs which would cost them in the vicinity of \$60 billion dollars at our prices.
- C. About one third of the Soviet defense expenditures are going for strategic offense and strategic defense. The bulk of this share is going into research and development, or into sophisticated military hardware for advanced weapons systems.
- D. The Soviets have not achieved the breakthrough they have been looking for, and we have no indications that they may be on the verge of one.
1. They are however, improving across the board, particularly in their strategic offensive and defensive capabilities.
- E. They remain behind the United States in the number of warheads each can deliver on the territory of the other.

1. There is, however, a new deployment program under way for ICBM's which is a Soviet bid to catch up with us numerically.

F. At the same time, as you may have seen in the accounts of Secretary McNamara's congressional testimony, they are deploying a defensive system around Moscow designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles.

1. We do not consider this a very effective system. It can be fooled, and it can be overwhelmed.

2. Also, it is being deployed only around Moscow. There is another system being deployed on a large scale over much of the Soviet Union, but this second system does not appear to have all the elements essential to a ballistic missile defense.

IV. The important conclusion to be drawn from everything we know about the Soviet military establishment is this:

A. The Soviets continue to increase their military budget and their effort to achieve a major breakthrough.

B. Over the next few years, the resulting improvements are going to give the Soviet leaders

increasing confidence that they are creating an effective deterrent, in the form of a military machine which can undergo nuclear attack, and still deliver enough punch to destroy a significant portion of the population and resources of the United States.

- C. We do not believe that the Soviets themselves expect to be strong enough--even over the next ten years--to consider the deliberate initiation of a war against the United States.
- D. But growing confidence in offensive and defensive capabilities is one of the factors which could lead to disastrous miscalculations when two countries are trying to face each other down, at the brink of a war which neither may want.

Soviet Civil Defense

- V. ~~The Soviet propaganda, some of the~~ military leaders <sup>used to</sup> ~~have been~~ <sup>had</sup> boasting that they ~~have~~ such an effective defense against ballistic missiles that the Soviet Union ~~does~~ <sup>did</sup> not need to worry about the imperialist rockets.

(DIAGRAM, Soviet Civil Defense Concept)

- A. Those  
responsible for civil defense in the Soviet





(1)  
(2)

Union think little enough of the anti-ballistic missile so that their strategy centers on evacuation, as this diagram indicates.

1. The Soviet civil defense program stresses low-cost approaches to population protection. It incorporates basement-type shelters of World War II vintage, with little protection against nuclear blast or fall-out.
2. In Moscow and other major cities, subway stations have blast doors, and there are booklets telling the individual citizen how he can reinforce a root cellar, basement, or silage pit to serve as a shelter. Many apartments built since 1950 have reinforced basement areas.
3. There is no organized program to mark, improve, and stock adaptable public shelter areas.
4. Existing shelter areas are probably sufficient for 10 to 15 percent of the ~~urban~~ <sup>total</sup> population.

B. The Soviet civil defense program, in other words, relies on sufficient warning to evacuate urban areas, and *emphasizes* protection for the command and control mechanism, planning for reception of the evacuees in the

(2)

countryside, and rescue and recovery after  
the thermonuclear exchange begins.

(TABLE OF ORGANIZATION, SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE)

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B. Until about 1960, Soviet Civil Defense was under the MVD, or Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1960 it was transferred, as this Table of Organization shows, to the Ministry of Defense, and specifically to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, *(at that time,)* Marshal Chuikov.

1. The Table of Organization parallels military command channels down to the local level, and military officers who have completed a ~~three year~~ civil defense staff school are assigned to civil defense staffs as far down as city headquarters.
2. ~~Much of the work, however, is carried on as it was during World War II by DOSAAF, a paramilitary organization which is a sort of a cross between the American Legion, the Navy League, and the R.O.T.C.~~  
*Below the national*
3. ~~At the city level,~~ civil defense becomes the responsibility of the civilian leaders who correspond to governors, mayors, plant managers, and the like in the United States.
4. The responsibility for establishing and preparing shelters also seems to devolve

1  
(3)

to the local level, where a combination of apathy and shortage of funds has resulted in a program which by and large will apparently not begin providing the necessary shelters until an emergency is declared.

5. Citizens are subject to compulsory training, however, and are obligated to serve if selected for civil defense duty. There are about 100 civil defense schools scattered across the Soviet Union, and as much as half of the population has probably been exposed to some instruction in civil defense. The Soviets are probably behind us in shelter preparation, but ahead of us in drills involving large public participation.

- C. In short, the main emphasis in Soviet Civil Defense today appears to be on preparations to maintain the processes of government, to try to limit casualties, and to provide rescue and repair services after an attack.

Soviet Relations With United States

- VI. I want to touch briefly on just two facets of Soviet foreign policy--relations with the United States, and the Sino-Soviet dispute.

VII. In public, Soviet spokesmen are taking the line that any improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is going to be virtually impossible as long as we are attacking their Communist brethren in North Vietnam.

A.

\_\_\_\_\_ They  
are practically forced to take this stand because the Chinese Communists are accusing the Kremlin of working with the United States against North Vietnam.

B. In fact, however, Soviet leaders have made it clear that they want to avoid any showdown with Washington over the Vietnamese issue.

C. They are, of course, delighted to see major portions of our forces tied down in Vietnam, but they also realize that they must keep their lines to Washington open and working, if they want any progress on the issues that really concern them--such as European security, arms control, Germany, and East-West trade.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute

VIII. As for the status of the Sino-Soviet dispute, relations between Moscow and Peking have hit rock-bottom, and we do not expect to see any improvement as long as the present leaderships remain in control at each end of the line.

- A. The Chinese have been doing their best ~~in recent weeks~~ to goad Moscow into a final break in diplomatic relations.
- B. Moscow is trying to hang on, and build a record which can be used to pin the blame on the Chinese if it comes to a final break.
- C. What is at stake is the supply line to North Vietnam. Each country wants to be able to prove that it is the major support of the North Vietnamese, and that the other country is just sitting on its hands, if not actually hindering the war effort.
- D. One important bit of background information is that the port of Haiphong in North Vietnam, whatever the headlines may say, is not a major factor in the supply of weapons to North Vietnam.
  - 1. We know what goes into Haiphong. Ships have brought in half a dozen big helicopters, and they may have brought in an occasional

batch of small arms or ammunition. Oil and gas, and some trucks, of course, are shipped in by sea.

2. But the weapons, and the bulk of the war materiel generally, come in overland, across China.

3. To a great degree, this is because of Soviet reluctance to risk a confrontation with the United States on the high seas.

4. And this is precisely the confrontation the Chinese Communists want to bring about.

E. Moscow has charged that the Chinese are diverting, delaying, sabotaging, stealing, and even re-labeling Soviet war materiel passing through China to Vietnam.

F. The Chinese, on the other hand, have accused Moscow of "cowardice" for refusing to ship by sea. Peking probably believes that in a pinch, the Soviets would still refuse, and Peking could then tell the world Communist parties that Russia had abandoned the North Vietnamese, rather than face up to American sea power.

COMMUNIST CHINA

I. Communist China itself has been rocked for almost ~~two~~ ~~years~~ now by the upheaval they call the Cultural Revolution.

A. You have all seen pictures of swarms of Chinese teen-agers on the march, holding little red books from which they chant quotations of Mao Tse-tung.

B. In China today, Mao's quotations are credited with almost miraculous power, although for the most part they are a collection of tired old cliches like "All power comes out of the barrel of a gun," or "Be resolute, fear no sacrifice, and surmount every difficulty to win victory."

1. Peking radio says fighter pilots shouted Mao's thoughts over the intercom as they started a dog-fight, and were therefore able to shoot down a Chinese Nationalist aircraft.

2. A forestry conference in Peking concluded that the study of Mao would enable the Forestry Service to grow better trees.

3. A worker in Lanchou, who broke an arm, a leg and several ribs in a fall on the job, was reported to have refused sick leave, because Mao's thoughts enabled him to live with the pain.

II. To us, it sounds ridiculous, but for the Chinese it is in deadly earnest.

A. Mao, at **74**, is aging, sick, and more and more inflexible. He is obviously concerned that his Communist party is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and cannot be relied upon to keep China on the right track after he is gone.

1. The teen-aged millions of the Red Guards are supposed to rekindle that zeal with their unbridled and uncritical enthusiasm.

B. To Mao, then, the Cultural Revolution is primarily a drive to reinvigorate the Communist Party, or even to replace it with a more reliable, more fanatical, younger version.

C. But for the men who are competing to succeed Mao, it has become a naked struggle for power and for survival.



III. Defense Minister Lin Piao was proclaimed Mao's *prospective* successor *in August, 1966*. He immediately began moving against any potential rivals.

- A. His main targets were the men who have been at the top of the party machinery, Chief of State Liu Shao-chi, who used to rank second in the hierarchy, and the party secretary-general, Teng Hsiao-ping.
- B. Today, Liu and Teng have virtually disappeared from public view, and Lin Piao, next to Mao, gets top billing, but one of the dominant figures in Peking is the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai.
  - 1. Chou represents the government, as Lin represents the armed forces, and Liu and Teng spoke for the party. If there is such a thing in Communist China, Chou is a relative moderate. His main concern has been to keep the government and the economy running.
- C. As the cultural revolution unfolded, three significant things happened:
  - 1--Some of the provincial bosses--the men who owed their jobs to Liu and Teng, and who run their bailiwicks a long way from Peking--resisted, politically and militarily.

2--The Red Guard mobs generated their own momentum, and to this day some of them do not respond to direct orders from Mao and the men around him.

3--Industry, agriculture, and public order threatened to break down as the administrative machinery creaked to a halt.

D. All this was a source of grave concern to Chou and the government administrators under him.

1. We also believe that Mao and Lin learned that they could not count completely on the loyalty of the troop commanders and troops. Otherwise, they probably would have used the army at an early stage to crush the resistance of some of the provincial bosses.

2. Instead, there have been pitched battles between Red Guards and workers, between rival Red Guard organizations, and in some cases between Red Guards and regular troops.

E. It is a fair conclusion that the excesses of the Cultural Revolution at least twice approached the level where there was a threat of civil war, along with the breakdown of such services as transportation and food distribution.

1. I might be stretching it to say that a sort of "Third Force" came into being and made Mao moderate the purge, but the fact remains that in January and again in August, the brakes were put on the Cultural Revolution.

2. For the last half of 1967, the regime has been stressing a return to normality, and efforts to bring in the harvest and get the country running again. *Lately, new fighting has broken out again in many areas.*

IV. The long-range effect of the Cultural Revolution remains up in the air, but there are three points we can be fairly sure of:

--First, until Mao goes and a new leader has taken firm control, China's leaders are going to be

divided and in conflict. They will find it difficult to agree to any new policy line, so we do not expect any radical departures from existing policies.

--Second, for some time to come, the Chinese Communists will probably suffer from a Cultural Revolution hangover that could limit their capacity to engage in foreign adventures.

--and Third, whoever wins, we can see no reason to expect any dilution of Peking's implacable hostility toward the United States.

Chinese Military Power

I. At the time the Sino-Soviet dispute began in 1960, when the Soviet Union cut off all aid to Communist China, Peking was left with the determination to renounce co-existence and stand the Free World on its ear, but very little by way of assets to do the job.

A. We have measured their armed forces in Korea. They have the capability to overrun any of China's mainland neighbors--Russia excepted, of course--but only as long as they do not encounter significant opposition from a major power.

1. The army is still basically a sub-standard World War Two Army. There are about 2,300,000 men, in about 100 infantry and a dozen armored or artillery divisions, but they are short on armor, heavy ordnance, mechanized transport and fuel.
2. The MIG-15s and 17s which the Chinese air force got from the Russians, or built with their help, are outdated, and the under-trained Communist pilots flying them have been outfought by Chinese Nationalists;

3. The navy has the world's fourth largest submarine fleet, but no sea-keeping experience; it is a coastal defense force.

B. If we were concerned solely with the conventional Chinese forces, that would just about cover the subject.

II. But the fact is that over the past three years, the Chinese Communists have more than made up for the loss of Soviet assistance in 1960, and have emerged with their own family of advanced weapons systems.

A. They have done it entirely on their own, and the major achievement, of course, has been the development of a nuclear capability.

[ B. At present, the Chinese nuclear weapons capability is crude and limited by our standards, but by Far Eastern standards it is a major contribution to Chinese Communist military prestige. ]

C. The <sup>seven</sup> ~~six~~ Chinese nuclear tests have shown that they have quickly solved the problems of achieving thermonuclear explosion, and that they can package nuclear weapons for delivery by missile or aircraft.

(Map, CHICOM MRBM Range)

III. We believe that the Chinese have been developing a medium-range missile with a reach of about 1,000 nautical miles, and that they are about to begin deploying operational missiles of this type, with nuclear warheads.

- A. From the borders of China, a medium-range missile can cover all of Japan and the Philippines, a good share of Indonesia, all of Southeast Asia and South Asia, and Eastern and Southern Russia as far as the Caspian Sea.
- B. A medium-range missile, of course, could not reach Alaska, or Hawaii, or even Guam, but we also have reason to believe that the Chinese might be able to deploy their first crude



intercontinental ballistic missile <sup>in the early</sup> ~~as early as~~  
1970s,  
~~1970,~~ if they start testing soon.

- C. The Chinese have assembled one copy of a Soviet submarine which can launch three ballistic missiles with a 350-mile range, but only when surfaced.
1. They may not yet have developed the missile for this submarine, and as I said, they have no experience in extended operations, but they certainly did not build this submarine for conventional coastal defense purposes.
- D. Chinese factories are beginning to turn out advanced aircraft to replace and supplement their obsolescent air force inventory.
1. Over the past two years they have produced enough copies of the MIG-19 so that they were able to spare some for Pakistan.
  2. We expect that they will soon begin turning out Chinese versions of the MIG-21 and the Soviet BADGER jet medium bomber.

Chinese Foreign Policy

- IV. When we look for the basis of Chinese foreign policy, we must bear in mind that they are an ancient people



who used to call their empire the "Middle Kingdom,"  
because to them it was the center of the world.

(MAP, "PEKING'S LOST EMPIRE")

A. This map, for instance, published in a Chinese Communist history textbook, shows areas once under Chinese domination which they complain were seized from the crumbling Chinese empire by unfair treaties with Russia.

1. You can see that their claims also extend to all of Southeast Asia, and even parts of India and Pakistan.

(MAP, PEKING GEOCENTRIC)

B. This map appears to be upside down; actually, it is a geocentric map, centered on Peking, showing the Far East as it appears strategically to the Chinese.

1. From this viewpoint, Southeast Asia is a natural ante-room for China and not just Taiwan, but the Japanese, Philippine and Indonesian archipelagoes are China's offshore islands.
2. Bear in mind that most of the countries south of China have at one time or

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another been vassals or tributaries of the Middle Kingdom, and that Southeast Asia is normally a rice surplus area. China, on the other hand, is less than 15 percent arable, and over the past decade the population has grown by more than 20 percent while food production has either stood still or--in bad years--decreased.

V. Part of the Chinese grudge against Moscow, then, is not an ideological dispute with the Soviet Union, but an inherent desire to reclaim Chinese territory seized by Imperial Russia.

- A. The Russians, like us, are by and large a people of Caucasian stock, and therefore the Chinese on racial grounds can hate Russians and Americans with equal fervor, because we are foreign devils, and white foreign devils to boot.
- B. But their hostility toward the United States is more implacable and more enduring for two reasons.
- C. Firstly, we are the world's champions of free enterprise, and the Chinese as basic Marxists

believe that war between Communism and Capitalism is inevitable.

D. Secondly, World War II not only carried American influence to the far shores of the Pacific, but left us the only Free World nation with the power and the motivation to contain the Chinese Communists within their own borders in the Far East.

E. The Chinese, then, hate us because we are foreigners, because we are capitalists, and because we are there.

VI. [Khrushchev is reported to have commented at one time that Mao's strategy would welcome global thermonuclear war, because China was the only country that could lose 300 million people and still survive as a nation..

A. This is bound to play some part in Chinese Communist thinking, but ] for the present, despite all the belligerent Peking propaganda about support for North Vietnam, we think that there are probably only three circumstances in which the Chinese would feel obliged to intervene there with military force.

- B. ONE would be in the event of U.S. air strikes against China itself.
- C. The SECOND would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam.
- D. And the THIRD would be the threat of imminent collapse of the North Vietnamese Government.
- E. This analysis, of course, is based to some extent on a Rational Chinese assessment of their national interests. So we find it necessary, in making this evaluation, to point out that there is nothing in the recent track record of Mao Tse-tung to guarantee that his decisions are going to be based on rational assessments.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

I. Obviously, then, we cannot dismiss out of hand the possibility of a shooting war with Communist China, and the nations of Southeast Asia have even more reason to be apprehensive. Let's take a quick look around Southeast Asia.

(Map, FE and SEA)

Indonesia

II. Until recently, the 100 million people of Indonesia, with extensive potential resources and important strategic geography, were sliding slowly but surely into the grasp of Peking.

- A. The Chinese didn't have to build a single landing craft, or make a belligerent gesture. They simply built up the Communist party of Indonesia, supported and guided it, and convinced President Sukarno that Chinese Communism was the wave of the future.
- B. The pro-Western Indonesian Army had almost been neutralized; the anti-Communist political parties had been banned or placed under tight controls; and the air force and navy were under pro-Communist leadership, when a badly timed

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and bungled coup attempt gave the army leaders a chance to turn the tables.

- C. Today, the Communist Party of Indonesia has been shattered, and General Suharto has completed the delicate and difficult job of taking away all power from Sukarno. This has been time-consuming because to many Indonesians Sukarno is still a combination of George Washington and Mohammed,-- with a considerable dash of Don Juan.
- D. But the process has been something like saving a hunter from the wolves, only to find that he is dying of starvation. If it were possible to bankrupt a nation, Indonesia is bankrupt. It owes more than two and a half billion dollars. Just to put the economy on a survival basis is going to take years of careful planning, international cooperation on re-scheduling debts, and heavy infusions of financial help.

Cambodia

- III. The Kingdom of Cambodia stands today about where Indonesia stood four or five years ago.

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- A. The volatile ruler, Prince Sihanouk, has decided that over the long run the Communists, and Communist China in particular, are going to be the winners in the Far East.
- B. He is accordingly trying to take out insurance, both for his own future and for that of his country, by establishing close relations with Peking, and with the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.
- C. Recently he may have had some second thoughts, partly because of the course of the war in Vietnam, partly because the Communists have refused to give him the assurances he wants on the independence of Cambodia and some long-standing border disputes with the Vietnamese.

- [ 1. His thinking is conditioned, however, by the historic hostility between Cambodia on the one hand, and the Vietnamese and the Thais on the other. This situation is not helped by the activities of Cambodian exile groups, alternately tolerated and supported by Saigon and Bangkok.

2. Sihanouk believes firmly that the Vietnamese and the Thais are puppets of the United States, and he therefore also holds us responsible for everything the South Vietnamese and the Thais do. ]

D. The evidence is that Sihanouk is against Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory for regrouping, refuge, and supply lines, but he does not have firm control of the remote border areas, so the Vietnamese Communists use Cambodian asylum pretty much as they please.

Laos

IV. Laos theoretically was neutralized by the Geneva agreements, and is ruled by a coalition government of rightists, neutralists, and Communists under the neutralist prime minister Prince Souvanna Phouma.

A. In actual fact, the principal rightists have made grabs for power and been driven from the country. The Communists have hung on to their half of Laos, which is vital for the Ho Chi Minh trail, the supply line to South Vietnam. They have refused to take the ministries assigned to them in the Laotian Government.



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B. [ That leaves the neutralists. The neutralist military commander, Kong Le, has been renounced by his own officers, and shipped out of the country, and ] the neutralist prime minister, Prince Souvanna, has become a firm anti-Communist the hard way.

1. For one thing, the Communist leader, his own half-brother, Prince Souphannouvong, has refused to negotiate or even meet with him, and has refused to accept the authority of the government in the Pathet Lao, or Communist, part of the country.
2. For another, there are now some 15,000 North Vietnamese combat troops, and another 13,000 to 15,000 support troops in Laos, showing no signs of leaving.

C. The fighting in Laos doesn't hit the headlines but it continues. Guerrillas of the Meo tribe, fighting on the government side, make a little headway in the rainy season, and then the North Vietnamese take it back again in the dry season. Last year there were more than 1,600 engagements in Laos. This is truly the "Forgotten War."

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Thailand

V. I want to mention Thailand because, whether you accept the domino theory or not, Thailand is the next Communist target in Southeast Asia.

A. Thailand is a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and a firm ally. *They have made air bases available for the Vietnamese War.*  
~~only time the Thais came close to wavering~~



~~against the Communists in Laos. At that time, the Thais suspected they had been left out on a limb, and they did not propose to expose themselves in the same way again.~~

~~1. Now, however, the Thai government is confident that the United States is committed in Vietnam for the duration, and~~ They are giving us wholehearted cooperation. ]

B. Thailand is paying for its pro-Western stance by an increasing incidence of guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla gangs are small, and cannot accomplish much, but the Viet Cong had the same limited assets in South Vietnam in 1959.

1. Fortunately, we know a lot more about counterinsurgency operations now than

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we did ten years ago, and the Thai Government and armed forces have been glad to accept our training programs. They are now engaged in both suppression operations, and civic action programs designed <sup>alleviate</sup> ~~to deny the guerrillas~~ the discontent, the isolation, and the poverty on which insurgencies feed and grow strong.

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2.

Otherwise, the Thais think that they have started their preventive measures soon enough to do the job themselves, and we *are inclined* think so too.

3. The guerrillas get their instructions from North Vietnam, and their training and propaganda support from both Peking and Hanoi.

[ They began their operations in Northeast Thailand, where there are some 40,000 Vietnamese refugees, but there have been outbreaks in the central and southern parts of the country as well. ]

4. The encouraging aspect is that they have not been well received by the people, partly because the guerrillas have to live off the country, and are still few enough in numbers

so that they have to use force rather  
than persuasion to obtain supplies.

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VIETNAM

(MAP, VIETNAM)

I. As for Vietnam, I am not going to give you a blow-by-blow on the military progress there; that could take all day, without adding too much to what you can read in the papers.

A. Instead, I think the military situation can be summarized this way: Since American combat troops went in in the middle of 1965, we have taken the initiative away from the Communists as far as main combat forces are concerned; we have prevented them from massing to launch an offensive; and we have inflicted heavy casualties.

B. Last year the Communists lost <sup>88,000</sup>~~27,000~~ killed in action, by actual body count, and another 27,000 turned themselves in.

C. Yet our order of battle shows that the enemy has more men than ever under arms--the main combat force consists of <sup>27</sup>~~27~~ North Vietnamese and <sup>10</sup>~~10~~ Viet Cong regiments--<sup>about 115,000</sup>~~more than 130,000~~ men in all, <sup>(support units, and other armed units)</sup> The para-military guerrilla forces bring the total up to <sup>about 225,000</sup>

II. The indications are that the Communist command has decided it is too costly at present to fight major military engagements against our superior fire power and air support.

A. They can still put together major formations, as they have around the border between North and South Vietnam. There, our Marines ~~run~~ *at times face* ~~running into~~ *(or five)* elements of four divisions. We will run into concentrations like this when the enemy feels that the target, or the weather, or our own dispositions justify the risk.

B. In general, however, the Communists are going to try to avoid major unit contact, and re-emphasize classic guerrilla warfare.

1. This shows that our spoiling operations have produced good results, but it is not purely good news. ~~[It is easier to kill one wildcat than 10 weasels.]~~ Suppressing small hit-and-run bands of guerrillas takes a great deal more effort, and very much more time, than defeating a conventional military formation in pitched battle.

C. There are no easy solutions. Some suggest that all we have to do is bomb Haiphong and the Ho Chi Minh trail. I have mentioned before that the war supplies that reach North Vietnam do not come in through Haiphong. As for the main supply line, we have estimated that last year ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Communist ~~battalions~~ <sup>forces in South Vietnam</sup>, each fighting on the average of one day out of every 35, could get by on as little as 20 ~~tons~~ <sup>military</sup> tons of supplies a day brought in from outside--and if we could cut every road in Laos, they could still bring that much down the jungle trails on the backs of an army of coolies.

1. ~~Now there are even more battalions~~, and we are forcing them to fight much more often, but the discouraging fact is that during the four-day truce for the lunar New Year, when we suspended our air and sea interdiction, the Communists worked like beavers by daylight and moved not 20, <sup>(tons)</sup> but 15 to 20 thousand tons of supplies south, to and across the borders of South Vietnam.

III. You can use the same summary for political stability, and for pacification. The news is encouraging, but we still have a long, long way to go.

A. The Ky regime established enough stability

to draft a constitution, elect a legislature, and then submit itself successfully for election as a constitutional regime rather than a military directorate.

1. Generals are still running the country, but they are running it as the result of an election rather than a coup, and there is increasing civilian participation in the government.
2. In four successive elections--for the constituent assembly, for district councils, for the legislature, and for the Presidency--80 percent of the registered voters cast their ballots.

[ 3. In areas under firm Viet Cong control, of course, there were no elections. But we calculate that in areas not under Viet Cong control, about 70 percent of the eligible voters are registered, and when 80 percent of those who are registered vote, that means that 56 out of every 100 eligible citizens are casting their ballots, which is an excellent performance by American standards.]

- B. As for pacification, about <sup>69</sup>~~68~~ percent of the total population is counted in areas considered under



firm government control. A major effort is going to be made to expand and firm up pacification, and the enemy knows it.

1. In ~~the first nine months of~~ 1967,  
*more than 1,300*  
there were ~~about 900~~ enemy attacks  
on the specially trained South

Vietnamese pacification teams trying

to restore order and develop a sense of

national unity in the countryside. *There were* ~~Almost~~

*2,100 casualties,*

~~500 of these workers were killed~~

2. A good share of the South Vietnamese army is now going to be assigned to providing security for the pacification effort, while the Americans, South Koreans, Australians and New Zealanders continue to hunt down the enemy main force.

IV. There is not, and there never has been, any great sense of national identity in Vietnam; the villager knows little about the central government in Saigon. To him, authority is the hamlet headman, or the village chief, or possibly the district chief. This is one thing the special pacification teams are trying to remedy.

- A. But this does not mean what you often read, that the villagers oppose the Saigon government and

really support and sympathize with the Viet Cong. And we have the evidence to show this.

- B. If this were a "people's war of liberation," as the Communists call it, its leaders would be local patriots.
- C. Instead, we know from photographs, and from the testimony of defectors and prisoners, that the Central Office for South Vietnam, which directs both the Communist military effort and the political work of the so-called National Liberation Front, <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>(until his death last July)</sup> commanded by a North Vietnamese General, Nguyen Chi Thanh, who <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the second-ranking man in the North Vietnamese armed forces, General Giap's deputy, and a member of the North Viet Politburo.

- [ 1. I do not recall that either the Marquis de Lafayette or Baron von Steuben ran the Continental Congress or commanded the army during our Revolution. ]
2. In COSVN, the deputies ~~to Nguyen Chi Thanh~~ for both military and political affairs are North Vietnamese generals who are members of the Central Committee of the North Viet Communist Party.
3. We have identified at least five other senior

North Vietnamese generals running major military commands in South Vietnam since 1964.

[ D. It is interesting to note that there are four military regions, running from north to south, in North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong continued the same numbering system, starting with Military Region FIVE and running on down across South Vietnam.

1. But the two northernmost provinces of SVN are in military region FOUR, administered as part of the DRV from Hanoi.

2. MR FIVE, which runs down to Darlac and Khanh Hoa provinces, is commanded by a North Vietnamese, Lt. General Hoang Van Thai, who is the North Vietnamese Vice Minister of Defense.]

E. As for the National Liberation Front, which is supposed to be a coalition of all rebel patriotic elements, representative of all of the South Vietnamese people, it has five Vice Chairmen--and at least three of the five are known Communists.

V. In the final analysis, the Communists know that they can no longer win by terrorism or by force of arms in South Vietnam; they can only win by waiting us out, by hoping that the Free World forces which defend South Vietnam--and that means mainly the United States--will tire of the war and pull out, or be forced out by world public opinion.

[ This hope explains why they show no readiness to negotiate. It sustains them--and at the same time, it is their ultimate vulnerability, because if we can make it clear to them that there is no such hope, that the beginnings of democracy in South Vietnam are going to be defended, not deserted--then Hanoi too will finally be forced to realize that this particular ball game is over. ]

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At this point, I propose to skip geographical order, and jump to Cuba, because today there are actually three brands of Communism--Russian, Chinese, and Cuban--which pose a threat to us, and Fidel Castro's efforts to spread his revolution in this hemisphere can be particularly virulent and violent.

CUBA

(MAP, CUBA)

I. Fidel Castro, in Cuba, has been endowed by the Soviets with the strongest military establishment in Latin America.

A. Morale is good, especially among the officers. The armed forces are loyal to Fidel Castro. They are fully capable of maintaining internal order, and they could defend Cuba against anything short of a large-scale invasion backed by U.S. help.

B. They have about 150 Soviet surface-to-air missile launchers, covering the areas shown by the circles on the map. They have tactical surface-to-surface missiles, patrol boats armed with missiles, and MIG-21 jet fighters, some of them with all-weather capabilities.

1. Over the past <sup>15</sup>~~eight~~ months, there has been a considerable increase in Soviet military shipments.
2. Except for the new MIG's and another six missile patrol boats, however, these shipments have consisted of replacements and spare parts.

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3. They started a new wave of rumors about offensive missiles, because there have been a lot of missiles for the surface-to-air launchers. These missiles have now been in Cuba for their normal shelf life, and they have to be replaced.

C. I want to assure you that we use every useful intelligence asset to keep a close watch on Cuba. Once every month we assess all the reports, and all the rumors, match it up against the best intelligence we have, to reach a judgment on whether there are offensive weapons on the island which could be used to attack the United States.

1. The rumors keep coming in, but the assessment remains negative.

II. Castro's threat to the United States is not a direct one. His threat is to stability in Latin America.

(MAP, LATIN AMERICA)

A. A couple of years ago the Soviets worked out an agreement with Castro that all Communist efforts in Latin America would be channeled through the orthodox Communist parties in the various countries.

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1. The orthodox Communists today are still willing to support a so-called War of National Liberation, or stage a revolution, when they judge there is a chance for success.
2. But they also believe that when the odds are against insurrection and insurgency, they should use opportunities for subversion and political action---what they call the "peaceful road to power."

B. In many countries of Latin America, there are dissidents who have left the regular Communist Party, forming their own, pro-Chinese and more militant wing, faction, or separate party.

1. There are also left-wing extremists who are not Communists--either Moscow-style or Peking-style--and who are more militant than the orthodox party. An example is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, or MIR, in Venezuela.
2. These militants favor instant revolution. The MIR launched a guerrilla war in Peru two years ago, with Cuban support, training, funds, and weapons--and some from the

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Chinese as well. They have been virtually wiped out.

C. Moscow, especially since the Cuban missile crisis, considers such insurrections too wasteful, and too alarming to the West, when there isn't a reasonable chance for success. That's why Moscow tried to hobble Castro's efforts.

III. Now Castro has junked the agreement. He has continued all along to train and arm guerrillas for other Latin American countries, and support them with propaganda. For the past year or so, despite the agreement, he has supported them in armed action---in Venezuela, in Colombia, in Guatemala, where he considers the time is ripe for action.

A. Early this year, Che Guevara and a number of Cuban guerrilla leaders launched a new insurgency in the remote, mountainous area of south-eastern Bolivia. The guerrillas were well-trained and well-equipped. Regular Bolivian army conscripts could not cope with them, but eventually trained counter-insurgency troops eliminated the guerrillas--in part because they generated no peasant support. In fact, it was information from a peasant woman that led to Guevara's capture and death.



expand guerrilla assets in Ecuador, in Brazil, in Peru again, and in Panama.

C. In most of these countries, Castro is either working with dissident Communist parties and non-Communist extremists of the left--like the guerrillas of Douglas Bravo in Venezuela--or, as in Guatemala, with individuals in the local Communist leadership who agree with him rather than Moscow, and want a more militant policy.

IV. [ What is his motive? Well, it must be a strong one; in a ~~recent~~ *(last March)* speech, he went so far as to say that the Soviets, by dealing with the governments in Latin American countries where there are guerrillas in the field, are betraying the revolution and helping to suppress it. Castro isn't even talking to the Chinese Communists these days, but there are times when he sounds like them.]

A. To Castro, revolution appears to be a way of life.

1. He apparently has a token contingent of Cubans in North Vietnam, and will probably send more if the North Vietnamese ask him to.

2. He has trained revolutionaries from Africa, and has sent several hundred Cubans to the former French Congo to train the militia for the leftist government there.
  3. He had instructors with the revolutionaries in the former Belgian Congo for a while.
- B. Specifically, however, Castro wants more Communist take-overs in the Western Hemisphere. He apparently fears that unless his Cuban revolution becomes an example for other Latin American Communists, as he has so often predicted, his own dynamism and mystique in Cuba could atrophy and eventually lose its effect.
1. He has an economic mess on his hands at home, and even if he <sup>should get</sup> ~~sets~~ a record sugar crop, ~~this year~~, world sugar prices aren't going to make Cuba prosperous. He needs successes abroad to rally the people at home.
- C. Castro sees his best chance at present in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. But

there are plenty of other opportunities which will arise elsewhere in Latin America, as long as the Communists can turn economic misery and public dissatisfaction into vulnerabilities for the established governments.

- D. This is what makes such a vital program out of counterinsurgency.

(MAP, INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA)

- E. This map shows areas of insurgency in Colombia today. There are only half a dozen of them, mainly in relatively remote mountain areas.

(MAP, INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1959)

- F. But in 1959, when the fighting was resumed in South Vietnam, there were also only half a dozen blotches of insurgency--and today, more than a million armed men are trying to suppress that insurgency. It pays to stamp out insurgency early, but it is even better to eliminate the vulnerabilities which create the climate in which insurgency can start and spread. That is one of the aims of the Alliance for Progress.

Round-up

- I. Finally, we might take a very quick swing around the world for some thumbnail summaries of the

spots where we have trouble or potential trouble.

(MAP, SOUTH ASIA)

II. INDIA: India has its fill of troubles--political, economic, and military; domestic and foreign.

A. The recent elections cut the ruling Congress Party of Nehru down to its thinnest parliamentary edge since independence, and left the government in majority control of the state governments in only 7 of the 17 states.

B. The resulting instability is going to complicate the problems of dealing with the food crisis--and India is going to need massive food imports at least for the next several years.

C. Externally, the Indians remain apprehensive over the belligerent Chinese posture on the Himalayan frontier, and there is no progress toward a settlement of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. There is not likely to be.

1. As a number of United Nations commissions have found, Pakistan has the stronger case, but India has effective possession.

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2. The Indians fear that any relaxation of their hold on Kashmir would inflame other separatist movements in a country where there are 14 major linguistic groupings and dozens of ethnic subdivisions.

(MAP MIDDLE EAST)

III. In the Middle East, we have excellent examples of crises that are never settled, but flare up and quiet down repeatedly.

- A. The prime example, of course, is the Arab Israeli dispute.
- B. For the third time in 10 years, the Israelis proved in June that they are still more than a match for the combined Arab forces, but the fighting settled nothing.
- C. The Israelis insist that they will not withdraw from areas they have occupied until the Arabs agree to recognize the existence of Israel and end the state of belligerency.
- D. On the Arab side, the Syrians and the Algerians want the Arabs to keep on fighting. Nasir, however, has prevailed with the relatively moderate viewpoint that the Arabs must get back what they lost by patience and negotiations with

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the Big Powers or in the United Nations. Even the moderates, however, are not prepared to talk directly with Israel.

- E. Meanwhile, the Syrians keep sending terrorists and saboteurs into Israel and the Israeli-occupied portion of Jordan, and Israel will probably soon feel it has to stage another retaliatory attack.
- F. The Soviets are re-arming the Arabs, but it will probably take another year just to build weapons inventories back to pre-June levels. And sheer hardware will do nothing more now than it did in June to balance Israeli training and motivation.
- G. One result of the Egyptian defeat in June has been to force Nasir to withdraw his troops from Yemen. Belatedly, the Soviets are moving to fill the gap; they are flying in weapons,, supplies, and aircraft for the Republican regime, and they may even <sup>have flown</sup> ~~be flying~~ some air support missions against the royalists, but the capital of Yemen is under heavy attack now. The prospect is for continuing, ~~and~~ indecisive, tribal warfare, with outside powers backing the various factions.

IV. Another crisis that threatens to be permanent is Cyprus.

- A. Turkey and Greece were probably both glad that outside mediation found a formula which averted



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war. The trouble is that there is no guarantee that the settlement will be honored by the third party, Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus.

- B. The Greeks eventually would like to see the island become part of Greece, while the Turks are interested mainly in safeguarding the lives and the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority--about 18 percent of the population.
- C. Makarios pays lip service to ultimate union with Greece, but what he actually wants is independence and a free hand to run the island. The Turks have no confidence that Makarios would respect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority.
- D. Makarios may ultimately push the Turks too far, and incite armed Turkish intervention. We have averted this twice, but only at the cost of being attacked as pro-Greek by the Turkish press, and pro-Turkish by the Greeks.
- V. The Cyprus problem thus puts the United States uncomfortably in the middle, just as Kashmir does with India and Pakistan, and the area between Cyprus and Kashmir remains a prime problem area for the United States.
  - A. You may recall that this was where we tried to erect what we called the "Northern Tier"--an alliance that was supposed to link NATO

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with SEATO, and shield the unstable Middle East from Soviet pressure. Originally, this was the Baghdad Pact; then, when Iraq fell out, it became CENTO. Its anchors were to be Turkey in NATO, and Pakistan in SEATO.

- B. But we have trouble at both ends of the line.
- C. Pakistan considers India a greater enemy than Communism, and is engaged in a triple balancing act. The Paks still want their alliance with us, but they also want arms from Communist China, since we have stopped supplying them, and they are working to induce the Soviets to be neutral in the Indian-Pakistani disputes.
- D. The Turks are improving their economic relations with the Soviet Union, accepting Russian aid and reviewing their treaties with us to ensure that they are not unduly provocative to the Russians.
- E. In the middle of the Northern Tier, the Shah of Iran took note of the way Pakistan's Western arms sources dried up when the fighting began with India. The Shah is convinced that the more extreme Arabs are going to attack Iran, and is concerned that he might also be cut off if fighting starts.



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relations with the Soviets, and has begun to buy weapons and other military equipment from them.

F. At the Western extremity, where the Northern Tier should be firmly tied into continental Europe, Greece at present is too paralyzed by its domestic troubles to contribute much to NATO, or even to work out an amicable relationship with the Turks. The present military leaders have no program and little ability to run the country. At present, it is questionable that they could or would restore a democratic government with the support and stamina to fend off the left-wing forces whose growing power provoked the military coup last April.

(MAP, AFRICA)

VI. Last stop, Africa. There are so many countries, and so many actual or potential trouble spots, that we have no time to examine them individually, so I must generalize.

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- A. Africa has a few countries in the South, sometimes called the White Redoubt, where the countries are still run by and for Europeans, or at least Whites of European stock.
  - 1. As long as this situation exists, there are going to be Africans either waving guns at the frontiers, or waving speeches in the United Nations, trying to force the major powers to step in and clear the way for majority African rule.
  - 2. Sanctions, by the way, are not going to work against Rhodesia as long as South Africa and the Portuguese African colonies help Rhodesia to evade the full force of the sanctions.
- B. The rest of Africa, by and large, consists of new nations where the African leadership is a paper-thin veneer.
  - 1. The Chinese Communists and the Russians are competing to develop influence over

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some of these men; the Western powers are doing their best to support and sustain the rest; and if the two sets of African leaders--a handful of men--kill each other off or neutralize each other, below them there is nothing.

2. There are only a handful of viable economies at present on the entire continent.

C. Nigeria probably had as good a chance as any of the developing nations in Africa to make a go of it.

1. It is the most populous country in Africa, it has substantial resources, and the British trained good administrators before they granted independence.
2. The most advanced Nigerians, the Ibos of Eastern Nigeria, were the best educated and best trained, so they got most of the government jobs, but they were a very small minority.
3. When some of the larger tribes took out their grudges against the Ibos in a blood bath, the Eastern Nigerians tried to secede and form a new nation, Biafra.

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hand, but now it has to fight its way into the central Ibo tribal area, and the fighting is likely to drag on indefinitely.

5. The trouble is that the old colonial boundaries do not necessarily result in a cohesive, viable nation. There are more than 200 separate tribes in Nigeria alone.

D. Similarly, the Congo Province of Katanga, Tshombe's old stronghold, is part of the Congo because that's the way the Belgians ran it 100 years ago.

1. Actually, as far as the tribes and the natural resources and the communications are concerned, Katanga should be a part of neighboring Zambia, but Cecil Rhodes grabbed that for the British before the Belgians pushed that far across Africa.

E. Today, you have developing nations in Africa which are aware that they can't run their own administrations, economies, schools, services--- but because of their former colonial status bitterly resent and threaten the foreigners who can still be persuaded to help them do the job.

F. There is ample evidence in our press today, and even in Congress, of how strong the temptation is to pull out and let countries like the Congo limp along on their own, but in the final analysis,